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2018 is shaping up to be one of the most important years in the history of the Slovak
Constitutional Court (SCC). Nine of the currently sitting 13 judges will see their non-
renewable terms expire in February 2019. The new appointments have the potential to be
shrouded in drama, as they will take place against the background of a constitutional and
political power struggle over SCC appointments between the President and the
government, as well as broader judicial malaise in the country.
Background
The immediate background to the upcoming appointment procedure can be found in the
recently concluded (sort of) constitutional saga surrounding the appointment to the SCC of
three judges nominated by the Parliament in 2014. For three years, Andrej Kiska, the
current President elected in 2014 in a run-off against the Prime Minister, Robert Fico, was
resisting to confirm the appointment of the candidates nominated by the Parliament prior to
his election. He finally caved in – albeit without accepting the SCC’s constitutional
interpretation – in December 2017 after the SCC ruled against the President and pointed to
a potential violation of the Constitution if he were to continue resisting to sign off on the
appointments. The I-CONnect blog just ran a symposium on this intriguing case (see also
two Venice Commission opinions).
The deeper background relates to the political and judicial situation in Slovakia. Andrej
Kiska is one of the few elected ‘beacons’ of liberal democracy in the region, as underlined
most recently by the re-election of Miloš Zeman in the Czech Republic, who furthermore
managed to disrupt the hegemony of Robert Fico and his party (‘SMER-SD’, transl.
‘Direction – Social Democracy’). Although it would be a mistake to put the latter in the same
basket as Orbán or Kaczynski, from the perspective of liberal democratic values, Fico’s and
SMER’s record has been tainted by persistent corruption allegations, rhetoric and inaction
on Roma and migration, as well as limited willingness to address structural problems in
education, health and justice.
While appointments to the SCC take place outside the ‘regular’ judicial system, the SCC’s
constitutional responsibility – which among others includes review of human rights
complaints – obligates one to see the essentially political nominations also in light of the
general state of Slovakia’s justice sector. The public’s trust in the judiciary is chronically
low, albeit somewhat improved on previous years, scoring 4.59 out of 10 in 2017 compared
to 3.27 in 2012. The judiciary is long broadly split between a reformist group of judges and
the old guard; in the most recent elections to the self-governing body (the Judicial Council),
the reform-minded association of judges was routed. The pantomime villain of the Slovak
judiciary, Štefan Harabin, continues to sit on the bench of the Supreme Court where he
consistently, along with his allies, acquits policemen investigated by the police inspection,
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which, granted, is mired in problems of its own, contrary to the practice of ‘rival’ Supreme
Court judges (for the best academic treatment of the structural state of the Slovak judiciary
post-1989 see the recent ‘Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Society’ by
David Kosař). The judicial and political power games have further manifested themselves in
controversies concerning the appointment of  ECtHR and EU General Court judges.
The upcoming appointment procedure
The constitutional kerfuffle surrounding the latest appointment process has prompted the
ruling coalition to consider amendments to how SCC judges are appointed. Presently,
Article 134 of the Constitution prescribes that the SCC is to have 13 judges who are
appointed by the President for a non-renewable period of 12 years, on a proposal of the
Parliament which draws up a list of candidates consisting of twice the required number of
judges. This means that in the upcoming appointment process the President should be
presented with a list of 18 judicial candidates, all of whom must (1) be at least 40 years old;
(2) possess a law degree; and (3) have practiced law for at least 15 years.
The President and the Venice Commission, among others, have called on the government
to make the criteria stricter. The main stated reason for the President’s refusal to previously
appoint the three disputed nominees was that they lacked the proper qualifications to be
judges at the SCC. Implicitly, this was a recognition that Fico was trying to pack the Court
with inadequate party loyalists, not an unreasonable suspicion given that two of the
nominees were long-standing members of SMER-SD (one with a record of involvement at
dubious universities as law professor).
As of yet, it is not clear whether, and if so, what the ruling coalition will propose in terms of
amending the SCC appointment procedure. It is, for example, unclear whether the age limit
should be raised, lowered or left intact, as there might be a shortage of highly suitable
candidates already as it is. In any case, as the core of the process is enshrined in the
Constitution, it is likely that any amendment will have to be of the constitutional kind which
requires a qualified majority of at least 90 out of 150 MPs. Achieving this threshold would
require the coalition government to obtain at least some support from the parliamentary
opposition.
One seemingly laudable idea is to require a broader consensus in the Parliament when it
comes to SCC nominations. The Parliament could agree on the list of candidates using a
constitutional majority instead of a simple majority which would at present entail
cooperating with the opposition. This would of course not prevent an Orbán-style
constitutional capture should a single illiberal party obtain a constitutional majority in
parliamentary elections. In more ordinary times, it would make for a more consensual
appointment process, however.
A more radical idea, unlikely to be implemented in the short time available, would be to
partition judicial nominations among different institutions. In 2016, the justice minister, and
one of the few bright spots of the coalition government, Lucia Žitňanská, suggested that the
SCC could be enlarged to 15 judges with five nominated by the Parliament, five by the
President and five by the Judicial Council.
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Whatever ultimately the solution, one additional factor might potentially complicate the 2019
SCC appointments. It is not only the nine SCC judges whose mandate is expiring in the
spring of 2019; the next Presidential elections are scheduled to take place only a month
after the new SCC judges should take office. Filibustering and stalling could therefore
represent a strategy to sideline the current President who has proven openly adversarial to
Fico’s interests, even at the expense of a temporarily dysfunctional SCC.
Nevertheless, there is also reason to think that the SCC appointment procedure could be
resolved in relative peace. For one, the government is no longer composed solely of
SMER-SD, and Fico’s coalition partners appear so far willing to act as a check on the
appointment process. Second, all the coalition parties, most of all SMER-SD, should have
an interest in avoiding a constitutional crisis or an obviously flawed list of candidates which
could play in the hands of the extreme right and other anti-systemic forces. As long as he
can appoint nine reasonable candidates out of the proposed 18, the President is likely to
play along and avoid sparking another constitutional bout despite considering the SCC
decision restricting the scope of his appointment powers, which runs in the opposite
direction than the SCC’s resolution of a previous controversy surrounding the appointment
of the general prosecutor, to be deeply flawed.
The outcome of the upcoming SCC appointment process will exert considerable influence
on Slovak constitutional justice until 2031. A smooth conclusion to this process ahead of
the deadline would not only send a positive signal about the present state of
constitutionalism in Slovakia but also represent a welcome reprieve for the region and the
EU in view of the recent developments north, south and even west of this small country.
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